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The Unwed Father's Custody Claim in California:
When Does The Parental Preference
Doctrine Apply?
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of nonmaritall births in America has increased dra-
matically during the second half of the twentieth century. In 1949,
for example, approximately four percent of all children were born
out of wedlock, while that figure today has exploded to nearly
twenty-five percent.2 In 1970, eight-tenths of one percent of all
American families were headed by a parent who had never been
married.3 By 1986, that number had increased nine times to 7.3 per-
cent.4 Moreover, statistics suggest that this figure will continue to in-
crease as nonmarital parenthood gains greater acceptance among
America's adult population.5
Not surprisingly, this situation has created numerous social and
legal issues which have challenged the legislatures and courts at both
state and federal levels. The issue which this comment addresses
concerns the fathers of these children and their treatment under the
laws of California. Specifically, this comment will address Califor-
nia's treatment of the unwed father who seeks custody of his new-
born child when the mother has chosen to relinquish the child and
place it for adoption. In Part II, the historical treatment of unwed
fathers under the common law will be discussed. Part III surveys the
1. The negative connotations often associated with words like "bastard" and "ille-
gitimate" have led to the use of "[m]ore euphonious terms" for more than twenty-five
years. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 256, 190 N.E.2d 849, 856 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). Accordingly, the terms "nonmarital" and "out of wedlock"
will be used in this comment when possible.
2. Krauthammer, If It's Unhealthy Maybe We'll Stop, Washington Post, Jan. 13,
1989, at A21. The total number of nonmarital births in 1965 was 291,000, and has in-
creased to around 900,000 in 1989. Statuto, Family Affair, Spring 1989 POL'Y REV. 88.
This increase has occurred in spite of the decrease in the total number of births by
over 500,000 since 1960. Eberstadt, Is Illegitimacy a Public-Health Hazard?, 40 NAT'L
REv. 36 (Dec. 30, 1988).
3. Williams & Williams, Identifying Daddy, 28 JuDGEs JouRNAL 2, 2 (Summer
1989) [hereinafter Identifying Daddy].
4. Id,
5. For example, less than one-half of the total number of nonmarital births in
1973 were to adult women, while by 1986 that fraction had increased to more than two-
thirds. Eberstadt, supra note 2, at 36.
constitutional rights6 of unwed fathers, as set forth by the United
States Supreme Court. Part IV will present the major cases and stat-
utory developments which have led to the unwed father's present
status in California. Part V will discuss the constitutional shortcom-
ings of California's present statutory scheme, in light of the unwed
father's rights to Due Process and Equal Protection under the laws.
Finally, Part VI will present some suggestions for resolving these
shortcomings.
II. THE TREATMENT OF UNWED FATHERS AT COMMON LAW
Traditionally, the child born out of wedlock was considered by the
law to be a non-person, often referred to as filius nullius ("the son
of no one") orfilius populi ("the son of the people"). 7 As such, he or
she had none of the legal rights normally created by a parent-child
relationship, such as the right to be supported and the right of inheri-
tance.8 The parents of the nonmarital child were viewed with "right-
eous indignation," and had neither the right to custody nor the duty
to support.9  Such an approach, it was thought, discouraged
nonmarital relations by socially stigmatizing both the child and the
parents.10
Eventually, things began to change. First, the duty to support the
nonmarital child was imposed upon the fathers, and the mothers
were granted the legal right to custody." Gradually, the father was
given visitation rights, as well as custody rights to a child whom he
had properly "legitimated."12 The father's right to custody, however,
is subject to the mother's right of custody, which is considered
primary.13
6. Under our present social, legal, and political structure, much emphasis is
placed on the "rights" of specific individuals or groups in specific situations. Conflict
arises, of course, when the exercise of one person's rights prohibits the exercise of an-
other's. In the circumstances addressed here, for example, most of the conflict centers
around the attempt to simultaneously protect the rights of the father, the mother, the
child, and the adoptive parents. For a compelling discussion of how and why the law
should de-emphasize "rights" in favor of "relationship and responsibility" in family
matters, see Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988).
7. Note, The Uniform Parentage Act: What it Will Mean for the Putative Father
in California, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 191, 192 (1976).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Note, Father of an Illegitimate C0ild-His Right to Be Heard, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 1071, 1072-73 (1966).
11. Note, supra note 7, at 193.
12. Id. Such acts of legitimation have generally included the marriage of the fa-
ther and mother after the child's birth, and the father's act of receiving the child into
his home and acknowledging the child as his own. Id, at 196. See also inrfra notes 36,
74 and accompanying text.
13. Note, supra note 7, at 193. At least two separate issues are involved when dis-
cussing the unwed father's right to custody. This comment addresses the issue of the
father's custodial rights when the mother has chosen to relinquish her custodial rights
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In sharp contrast to the common law's treatment of unwed parents
is the long-recognized "Parental Preference Doctrine." Under this
doctrine, "a court must award physical custody of a minor to a par-
ent, if fit to exercise custody, as against a stranger."14 Put another
way, the best interest of a child requires "that it be raised by its par-
ent unless the parent is disqualified by gross misconduct."15
Although the doctrine is rooted in the belief that a parent's right to
his child is like that of a property owner's right to his chattel,16 the
rationale behind its prominence today is that "a parent fit to exercise
custody may have a better understanding of the best interests of his
child than does the juvenile court."17 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed this doctrine in Prince v. Massachusetts,18 when it
stated that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture
of the child rest first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither sup-
ply nor hinder."19 Despite the prevailing recognition of the impor-
tance of the parental preference doctrine, however, the unwed
father-as a non-entity under the law-was not granted the benefit
of the doctrine at common law.20
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS: THE
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The common law status of the unwed father who seeks legal recog-
nition of his parental status has been changed dramatically as a re-
sult of four Supreme Court decisions.21 The following brief
through the adoption process. The issues presented when the unwed father seeks cus-
tody from the unwed mother who wants custody herself are beyond the scope of this
comment.
14. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 693-94, 523 P.2d 244, 254, 114. Cal. Rptr. 444, 454
(1974) (footnote omitted).
15. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 27, 61-
62 (1985). See also Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and
After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 322 (1984) ("If the Constitution has a
place for any intrinsic human rights that are not explicitly mentioned in it, the natural
parent's interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child is one of those
rights").
16. See In re Campell, 130 Cal. 380, 62 P. 613 (1900).
17. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d at 694, 523 P.2d at 254, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
18. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
19. Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
20. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
21. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
descriptions22 of these cases and their holdings present the constitu-
tional rights of the unwed father as presently recognized by the
Court.
A. Stanley v. Illinois
The first case, decided in 1972, was Stanley v. Illinois.23 Peter and
Joan Stanley had lived together intermittently for eighteen years,
although they never married. 24 During this time, they had three
children, each of whom Peter had acknowledged and held out to be
his own. When Joan died, however, the State of Illinois instituted a
dependency proceeding through which the children were placed with
court-appointed guardians, after first being declared wards of the
state.25 Stanley was given neither notice of, nor the opportunity to
be heard at this proceeding, because the Illinois law which required
the state to consider the relationship of the child to his "parent" did
not include unwed fathers in its definition of the word "parent."26
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
law,27 but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the denial of a hearing on Peter Stanley's fitness violated an unwed
father's equal protection rights.28 The Court announced that the pri-
vate interest "of a man in the children he has sired and raised, unde-
niably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection."29 With this in mind, the Court rejected the
state's contention that since most unwed fathers are unsuitable as
parents, a presumption of their unfitness was justified.30
Although Stanley provided unwed fathers with the procedural pro-
tections of due process, and recognized that the unwed father's inter-
est in his children is entitled to constitutional protection, there is
much that the decision did not do. Because the proceeding in Stanley
involved the issues of neglect and dependency, rather than the issues
of custody or adoption, some commentators were disappointed that
22. For a more extensive discussion of these cases, see Buchanan, supra note 15.
23. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a more extensive discussion of this particular case, see
Note, Constitutional Law-Stanley v. Illinois: New Rights for Putative Fathers, 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 1036 (1972).
24. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 649-50. The State was required to prove "unfitness in fact" when a mari-
tal mother or father or an unwed mother was involved, but when only an unwed fa-
ther was involved his unfitness was presumed at law.
27. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), rev'd sub nom Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The court considered the law rationally related to the pur-
pose of the state's Juvenile Court Act. Id at 134, 256 N.E. at 815.
28. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
29. Id at 651. The Court also labeled Stanley's interest as "cognizable and sub-
stantial." Id, at 652.
30. Id. at 654-55.
[Vol. 17: 969, 1990] The Unwed Father's Custody Claim
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
many questions, especially in the context of an adoption, remained
unanswered.31
B. Quilloin v. Walcott
Six years after Stanley, the Court provided some answers in Quil-
loin v. Walcott.3 2 Leon Quilloin and Ardell Walcott, who never mar-
ried nor lived together, became parents of a child born in December,
1964. Three years later, the mother, who had always had sole cus-
tody of the child, married Randy Walcott, and together they raised
the child.33 Although Quilloin had visited the child and provided
gifts and support on an irregular basis, he had never sought custody
of the child or attempted to legitimate it.34 In 1976, when the child
was twelve years old, Randy Walcott sought to terminate Quilloin's
paternal rights and adopt the child as his own. Quilloin received no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard, but his objection to the adoption
was overruled.3 5
In upholding the constitutionality of the Georgia court's decision,
the Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the fact that for twelve
years Quilloin had never had, nor sought custody, nor petitioned to
have the child legitimated by court order.3 6 Distinguishing Stanley's
concern with the need for an actual showing of unfitness, the Court
noted:
31. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and
Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10 (1975):
It is clear from these developments that the unmarried father has some rights
when the mother gives the nonmarital child up for adoption. The problem of
defining the scope of these rights remains. Is consent to adoption by the un-
married father required? If so and if he refuses to consent, is the adoption
frustrated by his veto or his silence? If his consent is not required, does he
have a right to notice of a pending adoption and a right to be heard? If there
is a right to notice and hearing, how far does it go? Does it include the un-
known father who cannot be identified? If the father appears and objects to
the adoption but does not desire custody himself, may the adoption go for-
ward? What should be the rule when the father desires custody, but is found
to be incapable of caring for the child?
Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
32. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
33. Id. at 247.
34. Id. at 249, 251.
35. Id. at 250-51. Under Georgia law, an unwed father had no power to object to
the adoption of his child unless he had legitimated the child by either (1) marrying the
mother and acknowledging the child as his own, or (2) obtaining a court order declar-
ing the child legitimate. Id. at 249.
36. Id. at 249, 256. The Court noted that Quilloin had never taken "any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child." Id. at 256.
Tihis is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, ac-
tual or legal custody of his child. Nor is this a case in which the proposed
adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child
had never before lived. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to
give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by
all concerned, except appellant. Whatever might be required in other situa-
tions, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find any-
thing more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the
"best interests of the child."' 3 7
Thus, the Court found the Georgia statutes to be constitutional "as
applied in this case." 38 Additionally, the Court set forth two impor-
tant policies: "[Tihe importance of preserving an existing family unit,
and the requirement that there be a substantial relationship between
the father and child as a basis for the father's assertion of full paren-
tal rights."39
C. Caban v. Mohammed
This "substantial relationship" factor was considered important
again the next year in Caban v. Mohammed.40 Abdiel Caban and Ma-
ria Mohammed lived together unmarried from 1968 to 1973, during
which time they had two children. Caban was named as the father
on both children's birth certificates, acknowledged them as his chil-
dren, and helped to support them financially.41 When Mohammed
left Caban and moved in with Kazim Mohammed, whom she married
one month later, she took the children with her. After Caban re-
fused to return the children from a period of visitation, the Moham-
meds began custody proceedings and ultimately petitioned to adopt
the children. Although Caban and his new wife cross-petitioned for
adoption, the New York court granted Mohammed's petition and re-
jected Caban's on the grounds that New York law required only mar-
ried parents or an unmarried mother to consent to an adoption.42
After the state courts affirmed the decision, 43 the Supreme Court
reversed, holding by a one-vote margin that the right to block an
adoption cannot be accorded to parents on the basis of gender
alone.44 New York's classification, Justice Powell wrote for the ma-
jority, "both excludes some loving fathers from full participation in
the decision whether their children will be adopted, and, at the same
time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the pater-
37. Id. at 255.
38. Id. at 256. It is clear that the Court's holding was limited to the facts before it.
39. Note, The Grudging and Crabbed Approach to Due Process for the Unwed Fa-
ther: Lehr v. Robertson, 16 CONN. L. REV. 571, 578 (1984).
40. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
41. Id. at 382.
42. Id. at 383-84.
43. See In re David Andrew C., 56 App. Div. 2d 627, 391 N.Y.S. 846 (1977); In re
David A. C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 92 (1977).
44. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 391, 393-94.
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nal rights of fathers."45 Clearly, however, Powell recognized that
some distinctions could pass constitutional muster, for "[iln those
cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the
rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes
the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the
adoption of that child."46
D. Lehr v. Robertson
The Court's most recent opinion came in 1983, six years after
Caban. In Lehr v. Robertson 47 the Court returned to the issue of pro-
cedural due process presented in Stanley. The daughter of Jonathan
Lehr and Lorraine Robertson was born November 9, 1976. Although
the two had lived together until the time of the child's birth, Lehr
never sought to marry Robertson, nor did he provide financial sup-
port for her or the child.48 When the child was eight months old,
Lorraine Robertson married Richard Robertson, and two years later
they began adoption proceedings in the Family Court of Ulster
County, New York.49 One month after commencement of the pro-
ceedings, Lehr, who had not been notified of these proceedings, filed
a petition in the Family Court of Westchester County, to establish pa-
ternity and gain visitation rights. The Westchester Court notified the
Robertsons and the Ulster County Court of Lehr's petition. Despite
its knowledge of the other proceedings, the Ulster County Court
granted the Robertsons' adoption petition without providing notice to
Lehr, because Lehr had failed to protect his interest by entering his
45. Id. at 394. The Court found that the gender-based classification was not sub-
stantially related to the state's interests in providing adoptive homes to illegitimate
children, nor was it appropriately based on "fundamental difference[s] between mater-
nal and paternal relations." Id. at 388-91.
46. Id. at 392. Powell distinguished such a situation from the one presented in this
case, "where the father has established a substantial relationship with the child and
has admitted his paternity." Id. at 393 (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens, in his dis-
sent, viewed the Court's holding as limited to cases "involving the adoption of an older
child against the wishes of a natural father who previously has participated in the
rearing of the child and who admits paternity." Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis in original). Thus, he expressed approval of a rule which would grant the un-
wed mother of a newborn child the exclusive right to consent to its adoption. Id. at
407. The majority, however, refused to express a view on such a rule. Id. at 392 n.11.
47. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). For a more extensive discussion of Lehr, see Note, Lehr v.
Robertson: A Constricted View of the Rights of Putative Fathers, 4 PACE L. REV. 477
(1984); Note, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathers and Adoptions: How Much Process is
Due?, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 265 (1984).
48. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251-52.
49. Id. at 250.
name in the state's "putative father registry."50
Lehr's petition to vacate the adoption order was denied by the
Ulster County Court, and the state appellate courts affirmed.51 The
United States Supreme Court also affirmed, rejecting Lehr's claim
that his due process and equal protection rights had been violated.
As to the due process issue, the Court held that the difference be-
tween the developed relationship presented in Stanley and Caban,
and the "potential" relationship presented in Quilloin and Lehr, was
"both clear and significant." 52 Protection under the due process
clause, the Court held, is provided when an unwed father exhibits a
desire to commit to the child, not as a result of "the mere existence
of a biological link."5s
The Court similarly rejected the equal protection claim, holding
that "[i]f one parent has an established custodial relationship with
the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never estab-
lished a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a
state from according the two parents different legal rights."54
The dissenters, led by Justice White, attacked the holding as a
"grudging and crabbed approach to due process."55 It was illogical,
White argued, to deny notice on the grounds that Lehr had failed to
enter his name in the putative father registry, when he had made his
50. Id. at 250-51. New York law required notice to be given to seven categories of
unwed fathers:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the
child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state .. . to be the father of
the child, when a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the
putative father registry...;
(c) any person who has timely filed [in the putative father registry] an unre-
yoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child...;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's
father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother...
and who is holding himself out to be the child's father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in
written, sworn statement; and
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months sub-
sequent to the birth of the child and prior to [its surrender].
(h) any person who has filed with the putative father registry an instrument
acknowledging paternity of the child ....
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2) (McKinney 1988). See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251 n.5. Lehr
failed to qualify under any of these categories.
51. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253-54.
52. Id. at 261.
53. Id. The Court further explained that "[t]he significance of the biological con-
nection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses
to develop a relationship with his offspring." His protection under the Constitution,
however, is dependent on whether or not he "grasps that opportunity." Id. at 262.
54. Id. at 267-68 (footnotes omitted). Clearly, the Court placed great weight on the
fact that in the two years of the child's life, Lehr had failed to establish a "custodial,
personal, or financial relationship" with his daughter. I&
55. Id, at 275 (White, J., dissenting).
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interest clear by filing suit to establish paternity.56 Furthermore,
White noted that Lehr had not developed a substantial relationship
with his daughter because Robertson had prevented him from doing
so.57 Due process should be accorded, White urged, since the state
had provided that an unwed father's consent is required if he was
"prevented from [developing the necessary relationship] by the per-
son or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. '5
E. Summary of the Supreme Court Decisions
Consideration of these Supreme Court cases makes its clear that
the unwed father is no longer to be treated as a non-entity under the
law. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect his pa-
rental right to develop and maintain a relationship with his children,
contingent upon his willingness to "act as a father toward his chil-
dren."5 9 As one commentator has explained:
[T]he message [of these opinions] is that if an unwed biological father is will-
ing and able to perform those functions that society has always deemed criti-
cal for the protection and development of children, the Constitution requires
the state to allow him to do so initially and to continue doing so, in the ab-
sence of circumstances not of the state's own making.
6 0
IV. CALIFORNIA'S TREATMENT OF UNWED FATHERS
A. The Historical Background
In 1872, California enacted Civil Code section 224, which provided
in part: "A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of
its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child without the consent of
its mother, if living ... "61 Under this provision, the common law's
treatment of unwed fathers as a legal non-entity,6 2 without any
rights in his child, was codified in California law.6 3
The Parental Preference Doctrine was adopted into California's
statutory scheme when California Civil Code section 4600 was en-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 269.
58. Id. at 271 n.3 (citation omitted).
59. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 n.7 (1979); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
60. Buchanan, supra note 15, at 382.
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1872), amended by CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West
1975).
62. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
63. For a decision based on this view of the unwed father, see Adoption of Bar-
nett, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1960) (the California Supreme Court,
when evaluating the validity of a mother's consent to relinquish her child, refused to
consider the lack of consent of the unwed father).
acted.64 In section 4600(c), the Legislature protected the preference
for biological parents by providing that custody could not be awarded
to a nonparent without the consent of the child's parent, unless the
court found that custody with the parent would be detrimental to the
child. Further, the court must find that custody with the nonparent
serves the child's best interest. A question left undetermined, how-
ever, was whether this preference would be afforded to the unwed fa-
ther, whose consent was not required for an adoption under section
224.
B. The Uniform Parentage Act and the Unwed Father
Exactly one hundred years after the original enactment of Califor-
nia Civil Code section 224, the Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Illi-
nois 65 that an unwed father's interest in his child "undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection." 66 In response to this decision,67 the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Par-
entage Act,68 which was subsequently enacted in modified form69 by
the California Legislature. 70
64. California Civil Code section 4600 was adopted in 1969 as part of the Family
Law Act, (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5004 (West 1983)), and provides in pertinent part:
(c) Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons
other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a find-
ing that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and
the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). For a full discussion of the legisla-
tive history behind the adoption of section 4600, see Bodenheimer, supra note 31, at 23-
25.
65. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
66. Id at 651. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
67. "The Uniform Parentage Act ... was intended to fulfill the mandate of Stan-
ley and its predecessors by 'providing substantive legal equality for all children regard-
less of the marital status of their parents.'" Note, supra note 7, at 204 (quoting Unif.
Parentage Act, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287, 289 (Master ed. 1987)).
68. 9B U.L.A. 287 (Master ed. 1987).
69. See infra notes 247-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the modifica-
tions California made when adopting the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).
70. 1975 Cal. Stat. c. 1244, p. 3196 § 11, codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021
(West 1983 & Supp. 1990). The UPA has been approved by the American Bar Associa-
tion, Note, supra note 7, at 192, and enacted in full or in part by seventeen states: Ala-
bama, ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to -21 (1975); California, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7000-7021
(West 1983 & Supp. 1990); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to -129 (Supp. 1988);
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 81- to -18 (Supp. 1985); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 584-1 to -26 (Supp. 1987); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2501-526 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to -1129 (1986); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51 to .74 (West 1982); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.817 to .852
(Vernon Supp. 1989); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -135 (1989); Nevada,
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.011 to .391 (1987); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to -59
(West Supp. 1989); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (1981 & Supp.
1989); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01 to .38 (Anderson 1989); Rhode Island,
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Under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), "It]he parent and child
relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, re-
gardless of the marital status of the parents." 71 Accordingly, the la-
bels "legitimate" and "illegitimate" are not used in the Act.
Furthermore, fathers are not classified solely on the basis of marital
status, but rather are either "presumed" or "not presumed" to be the
natural father of the child.72 In general, a father becomes presumed
under the UPA by doing the acts by which he could have "legiti-
mated" his child under the prior laws.73 Basically, this occurs when
the father and mother have entered into a marriage which is either
valid or apparently valid, or when the father receives the child into
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8-1 to -27 (1988); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010
to .905 (Supp. 1989); and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1977).
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7002 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); Unif. Parentage Act § 2, 9B
U.L.A. 287, 296 (1987).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); Unif. Parentage Act § 4(a),
9B U.L.A 297, 298 (1987). Although the UPA does not provide a label for the father
who is not "presumed," he is often referred to as an "alleged natural father" or a "nat-
ural father." For the purpose of this comment, the terms "alleged" and "non-pre-
sumed" will be employed. This section of the California UPA provides:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets the con-
ditions as set forth in Section 621 of the Evidence Code or in any of the
following subdivisions:
(1) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each
other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days af-
ter the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of in-
validity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a
court.'
(2) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have at-
tempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent
compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid, and,
(i) If the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a
court, the child is born during the attempted marriage, or within
300 days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce; or
(ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the
child is born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation.
(3) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have mar-
ried, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in
apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or
could be declared invalid, and,
(i) With his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's
birth certificate, or
(ii) He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary
promise or by court order.
(4) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983).
73. Adoption of Michael D., 209 Cal. App. 3d 122, 130, 256 Cal. Rptr. 884, 889
(1989).
his home and holds the child out as his own. Different rights are af-
forded to unwed fathers based on their classification, and the courts
have defended this difference as one which "reflects the Legislature's
resolution of a long-recognized tension between the best interests of
the child and the personal desires of a male parent who has neither
gone through a marriage ceremony with the mother nor shared a
home with the child."74
1. California's Version of the UPA and the Original Civil Code
Section 7017
Section 7017 of California's version of the UPA' specifically ad-
dressed the rights of presumed and alleged fathers when the mother
wished to relinquish the child for adoption.75 Under subsection (a), a
presumed father, or one who had legitimated his child "under prior
law of this state or under the law of another jurisdiction", was to be
given notice of the adoption proceeding, along with all the parental
rights under the Act.76 Under subsection (b), if the child did not
have a presumed father, the mother, or the agency or person to
whom the child was to be relinquished, was required to file a petition
to terminate the rights of the child's natural father.77 Subsection (c)
provided the method by which the nonpresumed natural father was
to be identified,78 and subsection (d) required notice be given to
him.79 If the natural father failed to appear or to claim custodial
rights at the section 7017 hearing, his rights to the child would be ter-
minated. Subsection (d) further provided:
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural father,
claims custodial rights, the court shall proceed to determine parentage and
custodial rights in whatever order the court deems proper. If the court finds
that the man representing himself to be the natural father is a presumed fa-
ther under subdivision (a) of Section 7004, then the court shall issue an order
providing that the father's consent shall be required for an adoption of the
child. In all other cases, the court shall issue an order providing that only the
mother's consent shall be required for the adoption of the child.8 0
2. The Early Application of Section 7017 in the California Courts
The original section 7017 clearly stated that only the presumed fa-
74. W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 308, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865
(1979).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017 (West 1975), amended by CAL. CIv. CODE § 7017 (West
1986).
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(a)(1).
77. Id. § 7017(b).
78. Id. § 7017(c).
79. Id. § 7017(d). Recognizing that there may be more than one "possible" natural
father, the UPA provides for notice and opportunity to all who may be identified
under subsection (c). Id.
80. Id. (originally enacted as Uniform Parentage Act, 7017 ch. 1244, § 11, Stat.
3196, 3200-01 (1975)).
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ther's consent was required for the adoption of his child. Everything
was not so clear, however, and the courts began to struggle with two
issues in particular: (1) what exactly was intended under the section
7004 provision which allowed a father to become presumed by
"receiv[ing] the child into his home"; and (2) did the parental prefer-
ence doctrine of section 4600 apply to a section 7017 termination
hearing?81
Addressing the first issue, a California appellate court held in
Cheryl H. v. Superior Court82 (prior to the adoption of the UPA)
that a mother may prevent the father's legitimation of the child by
refusing to either marry him or give him custody of the child so that
he might receive it into his home.83 This holding was expressly dis-
approved the following year in In re Richard M.,84 in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated that it was "not persuaded by the
mother's argument that her consent and voluntary relinquishment of
custody were conditions precedent to the boy's reception into his fa-
ther's family."85 Relying on a policy of liberal construction in favor
of legitimation,8 6 and on previous cases which had recognized "con-
structive" reception of the child when actual reception was impossi-
ble or prevented,8 7 the Court held that the father had legitimated his
child by "acknowledg[ing] paternity to his family and friends... car-
ing for [the child] and administering to his needs... [and taking] the
child into his home for frequent visits .... 88
Two years later in In re Reyna,8 9 the California Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District rejected the claim of a. father who argued that
he had constructively received the child simply by acknowledging pa-
ternity, since the mother had prevented him from having any contact
with his child. The court distinguished In re Richard M on the fact
that Richard's father had received the child for visits, and thus had
some contact, while this father had never had any physical contact
with the child, nor any personal relationship with the mother since
81. If section 4600 applied, then the court could not deny custody to the natural
father-whether presumed or alleged-without first showing that custody in the fa-
ther would be detrimental to the child. See supra note 62.
82. 41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1974).
83. Id at 277-78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
84. 14 Cal. 3d 783, 537 P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1975).
85. Id at 796, 537 P.2d at 371, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
86. Id. at 793, 537 P.2d at 369, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
87. Id at 794-95, 537 P.2d at 369-70, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
88. Id. at 799, 537 P.2d at 373, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
89. 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1976).
conception.90 The court then introduced an idea over which many
courts would later disagree9l when it suggested that the trial court
should award custody even to the nonpresumed father unless it
would be detrimental to the child,92 and that "legitimation will be-
come effected immediately if [the father] is awarded custody and
physically receives the child into his family."93
The key issue, which later led to the amendment of section 7017,94
was whether the court could terminate the rights of a nonpresumed
natural father who had appeared at the section 7017 hearing and re-
quested custody, without first determining that granting custody to
the father would be detrimental to the child. In other words, did the
parental preference doctrine of section 4600 apply to'a nonpresumed
father in a section 7017 termination hearing? After several state ap-
pellate courts had addressed the question, most of them holding that
the detriment test of section 4600 did apply,95 the California Supreme
Court decided the issue in the case of In re Baby Girl M.96
3. The Case of In re Baby Girl M.
The impact of Baby Girl M. was clearly expressed in the first two
sentences of the opinion:
We are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in terminating a nat-
ural father's parental rights by considering only the best interests of the child
without first considering whether an award of custody to him would be detri-
mental to the child. We conclude Civil Code section 4600 is applicable to all
section 7017, subdivision (d) termination proceedings and reverse the
judgment. 9 7
90. Id. at 301, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
91. Support for the idea that the court could or even should grant custody to the
father in order to allow him to legitimate the child (or to become presumed) had been
expressed in Adoption of Rebecca B., 68 Cal. App. 3d 193, 198 n.4, 137 Cal. Rptr. 100,
103 n.4 (1977). See also People v. Carrillo, 162 Cal. App. 3d 585, 596 n.13, 208 Cal. Rptr.
684, 692 n.13 (1984); W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 318, 160 Cal. Rptr.
862, 872 (1979) (Jefferson, J., dissenting); In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 134, 141
Cal. Rptr. 554, 560 (1977). The idea was criticized by the majority in W.E.., 100 Cal.
App. 3d at 311, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
92. Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 297, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 144 ("To restrict the parental
preference rule of section 4600 to fathers of legitimate children, in our opinion, would
be to deny [the father of an illegitimate child] the equal protection of the laws.").
93. Id. at 301, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
94. See infra notes 128-30.
95. The application of section 4600 to a section 7017 hearing was approved in
Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 296-97, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 144 ("[W]e construe the word 'par-
ent' as used in section 4600 to include the father of an illegitimate child.") See also
Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 17-18, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (1984)
("Since... a section 7017 proceeding... is a proceeding which places in issue the cus-
tody of the child [citation omitted], it appears the [parental preference] doctrine is ap-
plicable..."); In re Cheryl E., 161 Cal. App. 3d 587, 606, 207 Cal. Rptr. 728, 741-42
(1984).
96. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
97. Id. at 67-68, 688 P.2d at 919-20, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11.
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Edward McNamara was in his thirties and working as an estimator
for a general contractor when he met and began dating the woman
who would become the mother of his daughter Katie.98 Edward and
the mother dated from August to November of 1980, and neither of
them knew she was pregnant when they ended their relationship.
On July 18, 1981, Katie was born, and was placed in a foster home
soon after her mother relinquished her for adoption.99 Edward never
knew of the pregnancy and was not notified of the birth until August
1, 1981. He immediately contacted the San Diego Department of So-
cial Welfare, which was handling Katie's adoption, and expressed an
interest in her placement. On August 10, Katie's mother filed a sec-
tion 7017 petition to terminate Edward's rights. On August 17, Ed-
ward requested custody, and on August 24, Katie was placed with
Robert and Pamela Moses, the prospective adoptive parents. 00
The section 7017 hearing was held in December, 1981, and although
the court found Edward to be "a good parent [who] can provide a
good, loving home for this child," the petition to terminate his rights
and award custody to the Moses' was granted.i 01 Because Edward
was not a presumed father under section 7004(a), the court's decision
was based on the best interests test, rather than the detriment test
provided by the parental preference doctrine.102
Nearly two years later, the decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth District. 0 3 Rejecting the argument that its
decision would grant the nonpresumed father the power to veto an
adoption,104 the court applied section 4600 and stated: "[T]he doctrine
of parental preference in custody matters is not merely ideology, but
rather, is a recognized right. There must be a reasonable opportunity
to assert and effectuate this right."' 0 5
98. For a more extensive description of the extremely emotional facts of this case,
see Beyette, The Unwed Father; Edward McNamara has Fought Seven Years for the
Child He Lost Before He Knew She Existed, L.A. Times, Apr. 26, 1988, § 5 (View), at 1,
col. 2; Beyette, Unwed Father: The Other Side; Pamela, Robert Moses May Yet Lose the
Child Placed With Them Almost Seven Years Ago, L.A. Times, June 8, 1988, § 5
(View), at 1, col, 2; Gorney, The Disputed Kinship of Katie Moses; At Issue, an Unwed
Father's Rights and a Child's Future, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1988, at D1, col. 4.




103. 141 Cal. App. 3d 432, 191 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1983) (opinion deleted at 141 Cal. App.
3d 432).
104. 191 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
105. Id
In October, 1984, the California Supreme Court agreed.'0 6 Much of
the Court's reasoning was based on its interpretation of the Legisla-
ture's intent behind section 7017.107 Furthermore, the Court found
its holding to be consistent with the policy behind the UPA.108 Fi-
nally, the Court reviewed the related Supreme Court cases,' 0 9 and
implied that its holding was required by constitutional mandates.110
The case was reversed and remanded for a new hearing in which the
detriment test was to be applied."'
On remand, the trial court again terminated Edward's rights, find-
ing that it would be detrimental to remove Katie, now three-and-a-
half years old, from the Moses' home in order to place custody with
Edward. Again, Edward appealed, arguing that the trial court had
improperly applied the detriment standard by refusing him custody
on this basis, even though he was found to be a fit and loving par-
ent.112 The court of appeals reluctantly affirmed, stating: "Any reso-
lution of this issue would in some sense be unfair. It is only because
the operative legal standards focus on the child's welfare that we can
affirm the trial court judgment terminating Edward's parental
rights."'13 The California Supreme Court denied review.
The United States Supreme Court granted Edward's petition for
106. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 85, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
107. The court acknowledged that the idea of depriving nonpresumed fathers of the
section 4600 parental preference had originally been part of the section 7017 proposals,
but noted that "[a]fter lengthy debate ... the author [had] agreed to amend it out of
the bill." Id. at 71, 688 P.2d at 922, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
108. Id, at 71-73, 688 P.2d at 922-23, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14. Reading the UPA to-
gether with CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 221-240 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990), the Court held that
the rights of an unwed mother and a presumed father took precedence over those of
the nonpresumed natural father, for "[i]n the context of section 7017, the mother must
relinquish the child for adoption before the natural father has any rights." Baby Girl
M., 37 Cal. 3d at 72-73, 688 P.2d at 922-23, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14. Once this occurs,
however, the father's rights attach, and section 4600 applies. Id. at 72, 688 P.2d at 923,
207 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
109. See supra notes 23-61 and accompanying text.
110. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 73-74, 688 P.2d at 923-24, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15.
The Court noted that:
The Supreme Court has not directly considered a fact situation similar to
ours, where a mother has relinquished a newborn child and refused the father
any contact. Thus the court has not addressed whether the natural father's
parental rights may be terminated by only a best interests standard, or if a
further finding of detriment is required.
Id. at 74, 688 P.2d at 924, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 315. The court's constitutional reasoning was
based in large part on Buchanan's article, in which it had been asserted that "the state
may not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish a protected custodial rela-
tionship." Buchanan, supra note 15 at 351.
111. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 76, 688 P.2d at 925-26, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316-17.
112. In re Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786, 236 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1987) (ordered not
published by California Supreme Court, July 30, 1987).
113. Id. at 788, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (emphasis in original). By this time, Katie was
nearly six years old, and had lived all her life with the Moses'.
For a discussion of the problems created by the delays in the appellate process, see
Identifying Daddy, supra note 3.
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certiorari,114 but later dismissed the appeal for want of a properly
presented federal question.115
4. The Case of Michael U. v. Jamie B.
Less than one year after Baby Girl M, the California Supreme
Court's decision received its first major challenge in Michael U. v. Ja-
mie B 116 Michael was 16 and Jamie was 12 when their son Eric was
conceived.117 Michael and his parents were informed of the preg-
nancy and they expressed a desire to raise the child, but Jamie's fam-
ily preferred to have the child adopted by a married couple."l 8 After
Eric was born, Jamie filed a section 7017 petition to terminate
Michael's parental rights so that Eric could be placed up for adoption.
Michael, a nonpresumed father under section 7004(a), petitioned to
establish paternity and for an order granting him custody of Eric.
After a hearing in which the trial court applied the detriment test,
Michael was granted custody of Eric, and Jamie was given visitation
rights.119 This decision was made despite evidence that Michael often
used marijuana, had bragged to Jamie about his sexual relations with
other teenage girls, was not employed, and had experienced serious
academic and disciplinary problems that required him to enroll in a
continuing high school education program.120
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District af-
firmed the decision, deferring to the broad discretion of the trial
court finding that there was ample evidence to support the lower
court's holding.121 The California Supreme Court, which acknowl-
114. McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't of Social Services, 485 U.S. 1005
(1988).
115. 109 S. Ct. 546 (1988). The dismissal by the Supreme Court, however, does not
negate the existence of a constitutional issue, for a dismissal "on the 'want of a prop-
erly presented federal question'.. . simply means that the federal question, substantial
though it may be, was not raised at the proper point in the state court proceedings or
in accordance with reasonable state court rules." STERN & GRESSMAN, SUP. CT. PRAC.
380-81 (5th ed. 1978).
116. 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985). The Court decided Baby
Girl M. in October, 1984, and Michael U. in September, 1985.
117. Id. at 790, 705 P.2d at 364, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 40. For a more extensive presenta-
tion of the emotional facts of this case--primarily portraying the stress placed on
Eric's adoptive family-see De Salvo, Parents vs. Father: Ordeal Like Living With Dy-
ing Child, Couple Say, L.A. Times, Apr. 12, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 2 (Orange County ed.).
118. Michael U., 39 Cal. 3d at 790, 705 P.2d at 364, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
119. Id. at 790, 705 P.2d at 364, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
120. Id. at 793-94, 705 P.2d at 366, 218 Cal. Rtpr. at 43.
121. Michael U. v. Jamie B., 160 Cal. App. 3d 193, 206 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1984) (opinion
deleted at 160 Cal. App. 3d 193). Evidence had been presented that Michael, now 19,
had matured a great deal and had shown signs of a willingness and ability to act as a
edged that Michael was entitled to the detriment test of section
4600,122 reversed the decision, holding that it was an abuse of discre-
tion and not supported by substantial evidence.123
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kaus stated: "[Tihe more I think
about it, the more certain I am that the trouble with this case is not
so much the fact-finding process, but this court's unfortunate misstep
in In re Baby Girl M."124 Justice Mosk agreed in his separate concur-
ring opinion.125 But Justice Reynoso dissented, siding with the court
of appeals' determination that the trial court decision was supported
by substantial evidence. 126 Reynoso defended Baby Girl M. and the
detriment standard, and considered the majority's opinion "unfortu-
nate ... because the standards the Legislature has established (Civ.
Code § 4600) and our own guidelines [Baby Girl M.] have been weak-
ened, bringing uncertainty to the law."127
C. Section 7017: The 1986 Amendment
In 1986, the California Legislature amended section 7017, undoubt-
edly in response to the Baby Girl M. and Michael U. decisions.128
Through this amendment, the Legislature seemingly spoke clearly:
The custody rights of an unwed father, not presumed under section
7004, are to be determined by applying the best interest of the child
test.129 Thus, if custody by the father is in the child's best interest,
father to his child. This evidence included the fact that he had enrolled in a parenting
class at a local community college. 206 Cal. Rptr. at 328. Associate Justice Crosby,
however, stated in his dissenting opinion: "I believe this is one of those rare instances
where we should reweigh the evidence on appeal .... " 206 Cal. Rptr. at 331. (Crosby,
J., dissenting).
122. Michael U., 39 Cal. 3d at 795, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
123. Id. at 796, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
124. Id, at 796-97, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (citation omitted) (Kaus, J.,
concurring).
125. Id. at 797, 705 P.2d at 369, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Mosk, J., concurring) ("This
dramatically illustrates the fallacy of any test other than the best interest of the
child.").
126. 1d at 798-800, 705 P.2d at 369-71, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47 (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
127. Id. at 798, 705 P.2d at 369, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
128. Cal. Stat. ch. 1370 § 2 (1986). "In amending section 7017 the Legislature meant
to explicitly overrule Baby Girl M" Adoption of Christopher S., 197 Cal. App. 3d 433,
438-39 n.4, 242 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 n.4 (1987).
129. California Civil Code § 7017(d)(2) now provides:
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural father
claims parental rights, the court shall determine if he is the father. The court
shall then determine if it is in the best interest of the child that the father
retain his parental rights, or that an adoption of the child be allowed to pro-
ceed. The court, in making that determination, may consider all relevant evi-
dence, including the efforts made by the father to obtain custody, the age and
prior placement of the child and the effects of a change of placement on the
child. If the court finds that it is in the best interest of the child that the fa-
ther should be allowed to retain his parental rights, it shall order that his con-
sent is necessary for an adoption. If the court finds that the man claiming
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then the father's consent will be required for the adoption to occur.
If adoption is in the child's best interest, then the father's rights are
terminated and his consent is not required. Finally, the Legislature
added: "Section 4600 does not apply to this proceeding. Nothing in
this section changes the rights of a presumed father."130
Despite the clarity that the amended version of section 7017 ap-
peared to have provided, the "uncertainty [in] the law"'' regarding
the rights of unwed fathers in California remains. Two recent Cali-
fornia appellate court cases reveal this uncertainty.
D. The Case of Jermstad v. McNelisl3 2
Tom Jermstad and Nancy McNelis began dating in June, 1986.133
Jermstad, an officer in the merchant marine, was required to spend
much of his time at sea. However, during approximately half the
time that he was on leave, he stayed with McNelis. In December of
1986, Jermstad called McNelis while he was at sea, and she informed
him of her pregnancy. When he returned, they discussed the possi-
bility of living together or getting married, but McNelis decided
against either choice. They then considered adoption as an alterna-
tive, an idea which McNelis preferred, but of which Jermstad was
unsure.134
In April or May of 1987, McNelis selected a couple, the Ellisons, as
the child's prospective adoptive parents. Jermstad then expressed his
desire to have custody of the child, and the Ellisons informed him
that they would "back out."'1 35 However, after McNelis told Jerm-
stad that she would keep the child herself if he sought custody, he
informed the Ellisons that he had changed his mind. 3 6
In July of 1987, Jermstad met a woman named Joanne, whom he
married six weeks later. Joanne had two children of her own, but
parental rights is not the father, or that if he is the father it is in the child's
best interest that an adoption be allowed to proceed, it shall order that that
person's consent is not required for an adoption; such a finding terminates all
parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child. Section 4600
does not apply to this proceeding. Nothing in this section changes the rights
of a presumed father.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
130. Id
131. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
132. 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1989).
133. 1I at 533, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
134. Id at 533, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
135. Id, at 533, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
136. Id,
was unable to have more, and she encouraged Jermstad not to give
up his child. On August 20, the day the child was born, Jermstad in-
formed McNelis and the Ellisons that he wanted to raise his child.
Two days later, he and Joanne were married. 3 7
Jermstad's petition to establish paternity and gain custody of his
child led to a section 7017 hearing on September 30.138 At this hear-
ing, the court found that Jermstad was the child's father and
awarded him custody, apparently on the basis of the best interests
test. 3 9 McNelis appealed the decision, arguing that the court should
have terminated Jermstad's rights because he was not a presumed fa-
ther under section 7004, and that the court inappropriately accorded
Jermstad a parental preference. 140
The court of appeals viewed McNelis' first claim as an argument
that the natural mother should have the right to place the child for
adoption regardless of the wishes of the natural, nonpresumed fa-
ther.141 McNelis argued that this result was required by the earlier
cases of Adoption of Marie R.142 and W.E.J. v. Superior Court,143
which held that the mother may prevent the father from becoming
presumed, so that in such a case only the mother's consent to the
adoption would be required.l44 The court rejected this argument on
the grounds that it did "not square with the provisions of the Uni-
form Parentage Act."'145 Noting that Marie R. and W.E.J. had been
decided prior to, and thus on the basis of laws other than, the UPA,
the court relied on section 7010146 of the Act to hold that, under sec-
137. Id. at 534, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
138. Id. at 535, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Two days after Jermstad filed his petition, the
Ellisons filed a petition for adoption of the child in a different court. The section 7017
hearing held on September 30 was considered to be between Jermstad and McNelis.
The Ellisons were not made parties to this hearing, nor did they move to intervene,
even though they had received notice of the hearing. On appeal, McNelis argued that
the court erred in its failure to require joinder of the Ellisons at this hearing, but the
court rejected this argument. d, at 534-42, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 521-26.
139. The court made no express finding of detriment, nor did it expressly find that
its holding was in the best interest of the child. The judge, however, did state: "I'm
going to have to take a look at what's best," and "I don't think that the mother would
be the appropriate custodial parent." Id. at 537, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 523. The court of
appeals' rejection of the mother's argument that the trial court inappropriately applied
a parental preference by applying the detriment test is, in a sense dicta, for the appel-
late court concluded its opinion by noting that it was required to assume that the trial
court's decision was made by applying the best interests test. Thus, the court ex-
plained, "McNelis cannot prevail in any event." Id, at 552, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
140. Id at 542, 544, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 526, 528.
141. Id. at 542, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
142. 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978).
143. 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979).
144. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
145. Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 542-43, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519, 527
(1989).
146. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7010(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990) provides: "The judgment or or-
der may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the pro-
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tion 7006, the court could grant custody to the father so that he could
become presumed, despite the mother's wishes to the contrary.147
The issue raised by McNelis' second argument was whether the
1986 amendment to section 7017 resulted in a prohibition of the appli-
cation of the parental preference doctrine to the claim of a non-
presumed father, so that his claim to custody could only be evaluated
in light of the best interests of the child.148 Although such a result
had appeared to be the obvious purpose for the 1986 amendment,149
the court rejected this interpretation, concluding that:
McNelis's reading of the amended statute is untenable since it would deny the
natural father the equal protection of the laws which applies in cases, such as
this one, in which the natural father promptly seeks to shoulder the burdens
of paternity. We read section 7017 in conformity with the constitution where,
as here, its language lends itself to a construction consistent with the higher
law. The natural father must be afforded a parental preference under the
amended statute where he promptly acknowledges paternity and seeks cus-
tody of the child. 15 °
The court explained its holding by evaluating the major relevant
decisions by the United States and California Supreme Courts. As to
the United States Supreme Court cases, the court explained that the
father in Stanley 151 received constitutional protection because he had
had continuous custody of his children up until the mother's
death.152 The father in Quilloin,153 on the other hand, was not de-
serving of due process or equal protection because in the twelve years
of his child's life he neither had, nor sought custody, and thus was
not similarly situated to a married father. 5 4 In Caban,lm the fa-
ther's right to equal protection was violated because he was not given
power to veto an adoption, while the mother was given such power,
even though both had developed relationships with their children.'5 6
The Jermstad court noted, however, that the question of whether
such a classification would be justified in the case of the parents of a
ceeding, concerning the duty of support, the custody and guardianship of the child,
visitation privileges with the child .... or any other matter in the best interest of the
child." Id
147. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 543-44, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 527. See supra notes 84-
94 and accompanying text.
148. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 544, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
149. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
150. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 545, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
151. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
152. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 546, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
153. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
154. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 546, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
155. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
156. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. at 546-47, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
newborn child had been left open by the Court.157 Finally, the Jerm-
stad court found that the father in Lehr'5 8 had not been denied due
process since he had failed to come forward to establish a relation-
ship with his child by entering his name in the putative father's reg-
istry. Further, since he had not sought to establish a legal tie to his
child until the child was over two years old, there was no equal pro-
tection violation.l59
The court then turned to the California cases, noting first that, in
the case of Adoption of Baby Boy D.,160 it was held that the Constitu-
tion required that the parental preference doctrine be applied to the
natural father.161 Turning to In re Baby Girl M.,162 the court admit-
ted that "[t]he precise grounds of the [California Supreme Court's]
holding are unclear."163 The analysis of that opinion, however,
"strongly suggests that ... a parental preference is required in these
circumstances as a matter of federal constitutional law."164 Finally,
the court considered Michael U. v. Jamie B.,165 and noted that,
although three justices had criticized the Baby Girl M. decision, 6 6 "a
majority of the justices did not reconsider the precedent."16 7
Having reviewed these cases, the court determined that the Consti-
tution requires the claim of an unwed father who had promptly ac-
knowledged paternity and come forward seeking custody, to be
evaluated in light of the detriment test of the parental preference
doctrine.
Thus the court was forced to consider the effect of the amendment
to section 7017, an effect which McNelis argued was to deny parental
preference to such a father.6S The court rejected the argument that
the amendment had created this effect:
There are two impediments to this sweeping claim. The first is that to the
extent that the majority opinion in Adoption of Baby Girl M. rests on federal
constitutional considerations it is not subject to being overturned by a legisla-
tive enactment .... The second impediment is that the totality of the changes
worked by the 1986 amendment suggest that the statute does not prohibit a
parental preference, but rather frees the trial court from the constraints of
section 4600 in circumstances in which a parental preference is not supported
157. Id. See supra note 46.
158. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
159. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 547, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 529-30.
160. 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984).
161. Jerymstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 548, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
162. See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
163. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 548, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 531. See supra notes 109-10
and accompanying text.
164. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 548, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 531 (citation omitted).
165. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
167. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
168. Id. McNelis argued that the amendment not only prohibited a parental prefer-
ence in such a case, but also overruled Baby Girl M This argument had been accepted
in the 1987 case of Adoption of Christopher S., supra note 128.
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by constitutional considerations. 1 6.
9
Thus the court held that, if section 7017 denied the detriment test
to a father who had promptly come forward to raise his child, the
statute would be unconstitutional.170 The court considered such a re-
sult to be unnecessary, however, and determined that section 7017
"lends itself to conformity with the constitutional concerns." 171 The
true effect of the amendment, the court held, was to free the court
from having to apply the detriment test to all nonpresumed fathers,
as Baby Girl M had apparently held, so that the claim of a non-
presumed father who had not promptly come forward to accept re-
sponsibility for the child could be evaluated using only the best
interest test.172
Essentially, the Jermstad rule is that an unwed father in California
may receive a parental preference, and thus the detriment test, in
one of two ways: (1) by becoming presumed under section 7004(a), in
which case parental preference is provided by section 4600; or (2) by
promptly coming forward to accept the burdens of the paternal rela-
tionship, including the exercise of custody, in which case parental
preference is provided by the Constitution.
E. Adoption of Kelsey S.173
Kelsey S. was born to Kari Ann S. on May 18, 1988. Kari had
never married Kelsey's father, Rickie Allen M., although they had
lived together sporadically prior to Kelsey's birth.174 Two days later,
on May 20, 1988, Rickie brought an action to establish a parental rela-
tionship and to seek custody of Kelsey under California Civil Code
section 7006.175 Four days after this action was filed, Kelsey's pro-
spective adoptive parents, the A's, filed a petition for adoption under
section 226. One week later, on May 31, the A's filed a petition to ter-
minate Rickie's parental rights under section 7017. These actions
were consolidated, and the court issued a temporary order granting
visitation privileges to Rickie and the A's, leaving custody with
169. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
170. Id. at 550, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
171. Id. at 551, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
172. Id. at 551-52, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
173. Adoption of Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d 130, 266 Cal. Rptr. 760, review granted,
Cal. 3d -, 740 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1990).
174. Id. at 133, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62. The fact that Kar and Rickie had lived
together was not mentioned in the court's opinion, but was provided in a telephone in-
terview with Alys Brigs, Rickie's attorney in this matter (Mar. 2, 1990).
175. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 133, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
Kari.176
Hearings on the petitions commenced on August 3, and on August
15 the court found that Rickie was not a presumed father under sec-
tion 7004.177 On August 26, the court terminated Rickie's rights,
holding that such termination was, by a "bare preponderance of the
evidence," in the best interest of the child.178 On appeal before Cali-
fornia's sixth appellate district, Rickie argued that the trial court
erred in not finding him to be a presumed father since he had "con-
structively received" Kelsey into his home and, even as a non-
presumed father, the Constitution required that he be given the
benefit of the detriment test under the parental preference
doctrine.179
As to his first contention, Rickie argued that "since he took imme-
diate steps to establish a parental relationship with Kelsey and to
seek his custody, the trial court should have determined that he con-
structively received Kelsey into his home."'180 Relying on Adoption
of Marie R.,181 which had "squarely rejected the argument that con-
structive receipt was sufficient to elevate a natural father to pre-
sumed father status," 182 the court rejected Rickie's constructive
receipt argument, noting that Rickie "never received Kelsey into his
home or had any relationship with his son."' 83
Rickie's alternative argument-that the Constitution mandates
that he receive the parental preference even as a nonpresumed fa-
ther-was similarly rejected by the court.'84 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court first discussed the California Supreme Court's
decision in In re Baby Girl M.,185 in which it was held that the detri-
ment test of the parental preference doctrine should be applied.'8 6
Referring to the subsequent decision in Michael U. v. Jamie B.,187 the
court stated "[t]he Supreme Court's mandate in Baby Girl M. re-
mains equivocal, however."' 8 8 After discussing the amendment to
176. Id.
177. Id See supra note 72 for the text of section 7004(a).
178. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 133, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 762. One of Rickie's argu-
ments on appeal was that the trial court used the wrong standard of proof when it ap-
plied the preponderance of the evidence test in a section 7017 hearing. The court
rejected his argument that the appropriate burden of proof should be clear and con-
vincing evidence. Id. at 139-40, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
179. Id. at 133-34, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
180. Id Rickie relied on the holding in Adoption of Michael D., 209 Cal. App. 3d
122, 256 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978).
181. 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 245 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978).
182. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. at 135, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 139-40, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66.
185. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
186. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
187. 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 361, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985).
188. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
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section 7017, the court stated that it was "persuaded that this amend-
ment was intended to free trial courts from the Supreme Court's
mandate that the detriment standard should be applied to the claims
of unwed fathers seeking custody of their children."'18 9
The court then discussed the recent decision in Jermstad v. McNe-
lis,19O with which it directly disagreed: "We do not read the constitu-
tional restraints imposed by the Supreme Court as broadly as does
the Third Appellate District."'191 Referring to Stanley,192 Quilloin,193
Caban,194 and Lehr,195 the court asserted that "[n]o Supreme Court
case has mandated that a father, like [Rickie], who moves promptly
to grasp full custodial responsibility for his child, must be awarded
custody."96 Further, "no Supreme Court case has held the substan-
tive rights of unwed fathers with only 'potential' relationships to
their children equal to those of the children's mothers."'197 Based on
these views of what the Supreme Court has (and has not) held, the
court concluded "that a natural father's biological relationship to his
child, standing alone, does not entitle him to an absolute right to that
child's custody absent a showing of detriment."198
F. The Approaching Impact of Jermstad and Kelsey S.
Whatever else may be said about the opposing views in Jermstad
and Kelsey S., together they serve to reveal the confusion that contin-
ues to plague this area of the law, even after the amendment to sec-
tion 7017. Whether or not Jermstad is merely a "maverick"
opinion,i9 9 never to be repeated, the constitutional arguments will
undoubtedly be raised again. In time, the California Supreme Court,
and perhaps even the United States Supreme Court, must decide
whether the Constitution demands that the parental preference
available to married parents and unmarried mothers must also be
189. Id.
190. 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1989).
191. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
192. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
193. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
194. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
195. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1984).
196. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. at 138, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 765 (emphasis in original).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 139, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
199. Christian R. Van Deusen, the attorney whose firm represented the mother
and/or adoptive parents in Michael U., Jermstad, and Kelsey S., among others, is of the
view that Jernstad is just such a case (telephone interview with Christian R. Van Deu-
sen, Mar. 2, 1990).
made available to the unwed father who promptly acknowledges pa-
ternity and seeks custody, yet is prevented by the mother from devel-
oping a relationship with his child.200
V. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 7017 AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
A. An Evaluation of the Jermstad View of Section 7017
The Jermstad court's determination that section 7017 allows for a
construction consistent with constitutional mandates must be re-
jected because it construes the amended statute beyond its own clear
language. Section 7017 provides that, after determining that the non-
presumed natural father is indeed the child's biological father, the
court:
[S]hall then determine if it is in the best interest of the child that the father
retain his parental rights, or that an adoption of the child be allowed to pro-
ceed. The court, in making that determination, may consider all relevant evi-
dence, including the efforts made by the father to obtain custody, and the age
and prior placement of the child and the effects of a change of placement on
the child.20
1
Thus, under section 7017, the fact that the father may have made
all possible efforts to obtain custody, and done so at the earliest possi-
ble opportunity, is mere evidence which the court may consider
when applying the best interests test. In no way do the father's ef-
forts, under section 7017, raise his interest to one deserving constitu-
tional protection and a parental preference. Section 7017 and the
Jermstad opinion are in clear opposition, and if the constitutional
reasoning in Jermstad is correct, this provision of section 7017 must
be rejected as unconstitutional.202
200. Jernutad will not be the case which provides the basis for such a decision,
since McNelis and the Van Deusen firm have elected not to pursue petitions for review
of this case. A petition for de-certification, however, was submitted and denied. Tele-
phone interview with Christian R. Van Deusen, Mar. 2, 1990. Kelsey S., on the other
hand, may very well be the case to present the issue since the California Supreme
Court granted Rickie M.'s petition for review on May 3, 1990. It should be noted that
by the time the appeals have been exhausted, even a decision in Rickie M.'s favor will
probably do little to protect his parental status. Like Edward McNamara, the father in
In re Baby Girl M., Rickie will be faced with proving on remand that removing Kelsey
from his current home in order to place custody with Rickie will not be detrimental to
the child. Since Kelsey could be several years old by then, such a burden is practically
impossible to overcome. See supra notes 111-13.
201. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). See supra
note 129 for the full text of this provision.
202. Even if Jermstad were correct in its construction of the amended statute, the
statute should still be rejected because it is too vague and unclear. There is too much
at risk in the lives of those involved in a section 7017 hearing to allow the hearing to
be controlled by laws which remain unclear. The harm inflicted on the children and
adults involved when an incorrect decision is made, or when a correct decision is drag-
ged through the lengthy appellate process, can be immense. See, e.g., Baby Girl M.,
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B. The Equal Protection and Due Process Concerns
The constitutional issue which must be resolved is clear: whether
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment require California to apply the parental preference doc-
trine to the custody claim of an unwed father who, although not
qualified as a presumed father, has promptly come forward to accept
the burdens of paternity and custody of his newborn child when the
mother has relinquished it for adoption? It is the opinion of this
commentator that the answer must be "yes."
It is important to first note that neither the California nor the
United States Supreme Court has made an express holding on this
specific issue.20 3 The conclusion of this commentator has, however,
been presented, discussed, and supported in several of the opinions
discussed above.20 4 The essence of the reasoning behind these opin-
ions is presented in the following discussion.
1. The Classifications Created and the Scrutiny Required
The discussion of the constitutional issue begins with the recogni-
tion that California's statutory scheme, on its face, creates classifica-
tions which affect the unwed father. One such classification is
created by the fact that, while the protected status of the unwed fa-
ther's interest is made subject to the presumed-nonpresumed evalua-
tion, the interests of the unwed mother are protected without such a
test.20 5 In this respect, the law provides different protection to un-
wed mothers than to unwed fathers, creating a gender-based classifi-
cation. A second classification is created among unwed fathers by
providing greater protection (in the form of the detriment test of sec-
tion 4600) to those who are presumed than to those who are not.20 6
It is a broadly recognized principle, however, that all laws classify,
supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text. This harm can be avoided only by amend-
ing the statute to express more clearly its intent and effect.
203. Although it is clear that the United States Supreme Court has not rendered a
decision on this issue, it is less clear whether the California Supreme Court has done
so. The opinion in Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984),
made reference to the constitutional issues involved, but whether its holding was based
on constitutional requirements was left unsaid. See supra note 110. The Jermstad
court, although basing its reasoning in part on the Baby Girl M opinion, recognized
this lack of clarity. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
204. See Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1989), supra
notes 132-72; W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979)
(dissenting opinion); In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1976).
205. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
and the mere fact that greater protection is afforded to one person
than to another does not in and of itself violate the equal protection
clause.207 Because of this, equal protection claims are generally eval-
uated in light of the "rational basis test," which requires only that
the State's scheme of classification be rationally related to a permissi-
ble state objective.2 08 Despite this general policy of deference to state
power, however, the level of scrutiny employed by the Court is raised
when the classification "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect
class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution."209 Thus, when a law creates an in-
herently suspect classification,2 0 it is made subject to "the most rigid
scrutiny," 211 which requires that the law be justified by a compelling
state interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.21 2 The
same strict level of scrutiny is applied when the classification is used
to infringe on an individual's fundamental rights.213
Still other classifications, such as those based on gender, while not
considered inherently suspect, are evaluated at a less exacting level
of scrutiny, by a mid-tier test requiring the law to be "substantially
related to an important state objective." 21 4
It is clear that the present scheme in California has created a gen-
der-based classification. It has also been made clear, however, that
such classifications are justified when the father fails to "come for-
ward to participate in the rearing of his child," but not when the fa-
ther has "established a substantial relationship with the child and
admitted his paternity."2' 5 What has not been decided is whether
such a classification is justified when the father has come forward
207. Gulf, Colo. and Santa Fe R.R. Railroad v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
208. See U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221 (1981). These cases are among the many that emphasize that the rational
basis test is most useful in judicial evaluations of social and economic legislation.
209. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
210. The foremost among suspect classifications are those created on the basis of
race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Also included in this category are
classifications based on national origin and alienage; see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
211. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944)).
212. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
213. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) ("Since the classification
here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality
must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state in-
terest.") (emphasis in original).
214. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, (1971); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). The same level of scrutiny is ap-
plied to laws which classify on the basis of the marital status of an individual's parents
(i.e., illegitimacy); see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456
(1988).
215. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93, 406 (1979). See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
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and admitted his paternity but has not established a substantial rela-
tionship because he has been prevented from doing so. In such a
case, since the classification is based on the parent's gender, the
Court should evaluate the validity of the law by applying the mid-tier
level of judicial scrutiny.
More importantly, however, California's classification scheme
should be required to withstand strict scrutiny, inasmuch as it im-
pinges on the unwed father's fundamental right to raise his child.
The existence of such a right was made clear in Stanley,216 although
the subsequent cases of Quilloin,217 Caban,218 and Lehr 219 limited
this right to those fathers who had taken advantage of their opportu-
nities to manifest their willingness to fulfill the responsibilities that
attend the right. Thus, in Quilloin, this right did not exist for the
father who had failed to seek custody of his child during the twelve
years of the child's life,22 ° nor did it exist for the father in Lehr, who
had failed to protect his right by entering his name in New York's
putative fathers registry.221 The father in Caban, however, did enjoy
this right because he had developed a substantial relationship with
his child.222
In California, however, a court order declaring the child legitimate
does not serve to protect the rights of the unwed father as it could
have for Quilloin,223 nor is there any type of registry available to ef-
fectuate this purpose, as there was for Lehr.224 Instead, the only
method available for the unwed father in California is to become pre-
sumed under section 7004(a), 225 which is available to him only if the
mother chooses to make it so. But when the father has promptly ex-
erted efforts to accept responsibility, but is prevented from doing so
by the mother who has chosen to relinquish the child, the law should
recognize his interest as being as fundamental as those of any other
parent in his or her child. That being so, any infringement on this
right, such as California's denial of the parental preference, should
216. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
217. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
218. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
219. 463 U.S. 248 (1984). See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. In order to obtain the power to
object to the adoption of his child, the unwed father in Georgia merely had to obtain a
court order declaring that the child was legitimate. See supra note 36.
221. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 35.
224. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 72.
be subject to the most strict judicial scrutiny, so that the state must
show that the law is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest.
2. The State's Compelling Interests
There are many interests which a state has in a setting such as this.
Clearly, the most important interest, and the one to which all the
others relate, is the State's parens patriae interest in protecting the
welfare of the child.226 There is no doubt that this interest is compel-
ling. But to effectuate such a broad interest requires methods which,
because of their importance in protecting the welfare of the child,
could be said to become in a sense "state interests" in and of them-
selves. Among these methods are the parental preference doctrine it-
self, which protects the child's welfare by recognizing the interests of
the parents, and the adoption process, which protects the child when
the parents are unable or unwilling to do so.
a. The Parental Preference Doctrine as a Compelling
State Interest
The establishment of the parental preference doctrine as the fore-
most method of protecting the child's welfare was made clear by the
Court in Prince v. Massachusetts. 227 This doctrine recognizes that a
child's mother and father are presumed to know better than the state
how to provide for their child,228 and thus the state should allow
them to do so without interference unless it is clear that they are
failing in this task.229 Based on this, the rights of an individual to
bear children and raise them as he or she wishes is considered funda-
mental under the Constitution, and limited only by the requirement
that the parents fulfill this right by providing for the child and pro-
tecting it from harm.230
The parental preference doctrine, moreover, is not limited on the
basis of the parents' marital status, for even in California the unwed
mother and unwed presumed father benefit from it. In fact, the rec-
226. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
227. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also Note,
Not Necessarily in the Best Interests of the Chid. In re Baby Girl M., 20 U.S.F. L. REV.
701, 706-07 n.35 (1986) ("The United States Supreme Court has applied the parental
preference doctrine in rejecting most state attempts at regulating parental activity.").
228. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
230. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parent's right to choose child's ed-
ucation). This right is limited only by the state's interest in protecting the child from
harm. See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50-51 (1979) ("It
is fundamental that parental autonomy is constitutionally protected.... Inherent in
the preference for parental autonomy is ... the right of parents to raise their children
as they think best .... State officials may [however] interfere in family matters to
safeguard the child's health, educational development and emotional well-being.").
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ognition that the unwed father's involvement in his children's lives
promotes their welfare led Congress to adopt the Family Support Act
of 1988.231 It was Congress' concern over the unwillingness of unwed
fathers to get involved in their child's life that led, in part, to the en-
actment of this legislation.232 Yet the law in California serves to dis-
courage the father from attempting to become involved in his child's
life, for to the extent that the mother prevents him from doing so,
his efforts will remain ineffective and unrewarded. Thus, a state's re-
fusal to grant a parental preference to the unwed father who
promptly seeks custody of and responsibility for his child not only
lacks the necessary relationship to the state's interest of protecting
the welfare of the child, but may in fact work against it.
it is argued, however, that by allowing the mother to prevent the
father from obtaining a parental preference so that she can relin-
quish the child to adoptive parents without the obstacle of his vetoing
the adoption, the child's welfare is protected through the parental
preference afforded to the mother.233 In essence, the argument is
that the mother's choice to relinquish the child is not a forfeiture of
her parental rights and responsibilities, but rather a fulfillment of
them. To allow the father to interrupt this act of responsibility, it is
argued, would be to prevent the mother from caring and providing
for the child.
Such an argument, while in a sense very persuasive, fails on two
points. First, the relinquishment of one's child is considered at law to
be an abandonment of the child, not the fulfillment or exercise of a
parental right.234 Thus, once the child is abandoned by the mother
231. Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (Oct. 13, 1988).
232. Identifying Daddy, supra note 3, at 5.
233. See Bartlett, supra note 6, at 31526, for a discussion of this argument.
234. In re Brittany H., 198 Cal. App. 3d 533, 548, 243 Cal. Rptr 763, 771 (1983). In
Brittany H., Evette was 18 and unmarried when she selected Debbie and David J. as
the prospective adoptive parents of her soon-to-be-born child. During the pregnancy,
the J.s attended Lamaze classes with Evette, and helped pay for medical expenses. Af-
ter the birth, the child was given to the J.s who selected the child's name. Evette, in
the meantime, began to express dissatisfaction with the J.s, especially in regard to
Debbie's decision to continue working while raising the child. On October 17, 1985,
less than six months after the child's birth, Evette arrived at the J.s home with a dep-
uty sheriff, seeking to take the child back. Id. at 542, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 767. Her inten-
tion, however, was not to withdraw consent to the child's adoption, but to have the
child placed with one of three families whom she had selected since the child was born
and placed with the J.s. Id. at 543, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
In a suit brought by the J.s to terminate Evette's parental rights on the basis of
abandonment, Evette argued that her attempt to remove the child on October 17 pre-
cluded a finding of abandonment, since this occurred within the six-month period stip-
ulated in CAL. CIV. CODE § 232. Because of her intention to relinquish the child to a
who has primary rights, the father must be afforded a preference
above the adoptive parents. The second point on which this argu-
ment fails is that it is based on an incorrect assumption, for "[ilt is
extremely doubtful ... that the child's best interests are always the
mother's prime concern; or even if they are, that her decision will
necessarily promote those best interests."23 5 To allow the mother to
make this decision without allowing the interested and willing father
to intervene is to grant a deference to the mother's motives and rea-
soning that is undeserved.
Furthermore, such an argument creates a presumption against the
unwed father which is likewise undeserved.236 To create such a pre-
sumption on the grounds that he is normally a disinterested "casual
inseminator,"23 7 as some courts have done, is to ignore the facts, for
studies indicate "that few nonmarital births emanate from casual re-
lationships."2 38 Furthermore, if the father in a particular case is a,
casual inseminator, then the mother is just as surely a "casual recipi-
ent" of insemination who, but for biological constraints, might just as
quickly walk away from the results of the insemination. More im-
portantly, when the father has promptly claimed paternity and
sought custody of the child, the court is not dealing with a father who
has walked away, but with one who has attempted to fulfill his re-
sponsibility and has been prevented from doing so by the mother and
by the legal system which grants her this power.
In summary, the refusal to grant fundamental parental rights to
the father who promptly acknowledges paternity and seeks custody,
but is prevented from becoming presumed due to the actions of the
mother, is not justified by, and in fact may interfere with, the state's
new set of adoptive parents, however, the court found that she had abandoned her
child despite her argument that she was only seeking to exercise her parental rights.
Id. at 548, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 771. In rejecting this argument, the court stated:
If the intent of a natural parent to "exercise parental rights" were found to be
controlling rather than an intent to abandon the child by giving it up for adop-
tion, then the natural parent could move the child on the 29th day of the 5th
month ad infinitum until a 'suitable' home is found.
Id. The court thus held that it is the "intent to abandon," and not the "exercise of
parental rights," which is controlling when a parent relinquishes his or her child for
adoption. Id
235. Comment, Plight of the Putative Father in California Child Custody Proceed-
ings: A Problem of Equal Protection, 6 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1, 11 (1973).
236. See Note, supra note 7, at 222 ("[I]t makes no more sense to insist that all un-
wed fathers are disinterested and unfit parents than it does to continue in the belief
that all mothers are by nature interested in raising children.").
237. The term "casual inseminator" was used in Michael U v. Jamie B, 39 Cal. 3d
787, 797, 705 P.2d 362, 369, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 45 (1985) (Mosk, J., concurring), and is one
of several terms often used to emphasize the short-term relationship between some
unwed fathers and mothers.
238. Identifying Daddy, supra note 3, at 5. The studies do show that the non-mar-
ried father's willingness to remain involved with his child "declines rapidly over time."
Id.
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goal of protecting the child's welfare through the parental preference
doctrine.
b. The State's Compelling Interest in the Adoption Process
A second method of protecting the child's welfare, and one which
also should be considered a compelling state interest in and of itself,
is the adoption process. 239 It is clear that, although "in times past,
adoption primarily served the interests of the adopter in perpetuating
his family name and fortune, today the paramount concern is the
protection of the child's best interests. [All other concerns] are sec-
ondary." 240 Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the welfare, prompt placement, and final adoption of nonmarital
children are significant governmental interests.2 41 The argument
that is often made is that by allowing all unwed fathers to interfere
with the adoption process by granting them a parental preference,
the adoption process will suffer from irreparable delays and a subse-
quent loss of confidence by prospective adoptive parents. 242
Such an argument fails in two respects. First, adoption, while un-
doubtedly the most effective method of caring for unwanted or mis-
treated children, is just that-a method of caring for unwanted or
mistreated children. In the case of a father who promptly seeks cus-
tody, the child suffers from neither of these ailments, and thus adop-
tion is not necessary. To prefer adoption, even by a stable, two-
parent family, over custody by a single, less than ideal father who is
nevertheless capable of caring for his child, is to engage in a type of
239. For a more extensive discussion of the state's interest in the adoption process,
see Buchanan, supra note 15, at 331-32; Gorney, The Disputed Kinship of Katie Moses
At Issue, An Unwed Father's Rights and a Child's Future, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1988, at
D1, col. 1.
240. Bodenheimer, supra note 31 at 16.
241. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1984). The benefits of the adoption pro-
cess have been well stated as follows:
Adoption safeguards the welfare of children whose parents are unwilling or
unable to care for them; eliminates the need for long-term State guardian-
ship-a role that, despite efforts on many levels, has proved almost impossible
for governments to fill effectively or economically; and bestows on illegitimate
children the benefits of legitimacy. Adoption also saves biological parents
from distressful burdens with which they would be unable to cope, thus free-
ing them to lead more productive lives. It provides a practical alternative to
abortion; and--critically-secures for adoptees and childless couples opportu-
nities to develop and enjoy deeply satisfying parent-child relationships.
Amicus Brief of Barker Foundation for Appellees, McNamara v. County of San Diego
Dept. of Social Services, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
242. See Amicus Brief of Barker Foundation, supra note 241.
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"social engineering" 243 which borders on governmental interference
more akin to the policies of dictatorial forms of government than to
our own.
244
Second, this argument fails because the delays and obstacles which
are the feared result of granting this father a parental preference
will not, in fact, be the actual result. The nonpresumed unwed father
who deserves the parental preference, as the Jermstad court recog-
nized,245 is the one who promptly asserts his custody claim. Those
who make this argument would be correct if the preference were to
be applied to the father who, like Quilloin, seeks to obtain custody
years after the child's birth, but the Constitution does not require
this. It is the father who comes forth early, before the child is placed
with and begins to develop a psychological relationship with the
adoptive parents, who deserves a parental preference. 246
In light of this, the denial of a parental preference to the father
who promptly comes forward to accept the responsibilities of pater-
nity is not justified by the state's interest in promoting the welfare of
the child through the adoption process, and such a denial on these
grounds thus violates the father's constitutional rights.
3. The Lack of a Sufficiently Tailored Approach: California's
Modifications of the UPA
California's scheme, which makes the father's rights dependent on
the mother's willingness to allow him to become presumed, not only
differs from the situations faced by Quilloin 24 7 and Lehr,248 but in
fact represents a substantial modification of the original Uniform
Parentage Act.2 49 An overview of the major modifications which
California has made will reveal how California's law, while aimed at
243. In re Baby Boy S., 194 Cal. App. 3d 925, 932, 240 Cal. Rptr. 60, 64 (1987) (when
evaluating the competing custody claims of well-qualified adoptive parents and a less-
ideal nonmarital mother, the court stated, "were this a situation of social engineering,
the decision would be very easy for this court.").
244. In 1984, one California appellate court supported its refusal to sever parental
ties on the basis of the best interest test alone by stating- "Whereas 1984 is upon us
chronologically, we shall strive to stave off its Orwelliafi ramifications. Too near in
our history another government attempted to impose its arbitrary decision on parental
selection." In re Cheryl E., 161 Cal. App. 3d 587, 607, 207 Cal. Rptr. 728, 742 (1984).
245. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
246. It is noteworthy that even the adoptive parents of Baby Girl M. admitted that
Edward McNamara "did not get a fair shake. He was wronged. That's not even partic-
ularly debateable." Beyette, Unwed Father: The Other Side, L.A. Times, June 8, 1988,
part 5 at 1, col. 2.
247. See supra note 35. Quilloin could have protected his rights through judicial
proceedings.
248. See supra note 50. Lehr could have protected his rights through New York's
putative fathers registry.
249. See In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 130 n.2, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554, 558 n.2
(1977).
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protecting the state's compelling interest in the child's welfare, is not
narrowly tailored to avoid infringing on the unwed father's constitu-
tional rights.
The first major modification was made in section 4(a) of the UPA,
which was enacted in California as section 7004(a). 250 In this section,
which provides the means through which an unwed father may be-
come presumed, California omitted subsection (5) of the original Act,
which provides:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with the [ap-
propriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which shall promptly inform the
mother of the filing of the acknowledgment, and she does not dispute the ac-
knowledgment within a reasonable time after being informed thereof, in a
writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau]. If an-
other man is presumed under this section to be the child's father, acknowledg-
ment may be effected only with the written consent of the presumed father or
after the presumption has been rebutted.2 5 1
Under this provision, the father is afforded an opportunity to be-
come presumed even if the mother refuses to marry him or allow
him to receive the child into his home. By filing a written acknowl-
edgment of paternity, the father may become presumed unless the
mother actually disputes his paternity claim. Even if she does this,
however, the court will hear this dispute and may determine that the
man is indeed the father of the child.
The second major modification was made in the adoption of section
6 of the UPA, which provides rules regarding who may bring an ac-
tion to determine the existence of paternity. Subsection (c) of section
6, which addresses this issue when there is no presumed father in-
volved, provides that such an action may be brought by the child or
her representative, the appropriate state agency, the mother or her
representative, or the alleged father or his representative. 2 5 2
250. See supra note 72 for the text of § 7004(a).
251. Unif. Parentage Act § 4(a)(5), 9B U.L.A. 287, 299 (1987). Although California
completely omitted this provision, a subsection (a)(5) was added to section 7004 in 1987.
The California provision, which is completely different from the UPA provision
provides:
(5) if the child was born and resides in a nation with which the United States
engages in an Orderly Departure Program or successor program, he acknowl-
edges that he is the child's father in a declaration under penalty of perjury, as
specified in Section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This paragraph
shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and on that date shall be-
come inoperative.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
252. Unif. Parentage Act § 6(c), 9B U.L.A. at 303 provides:
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Although California adopted all of section 6(c), this provision was
modified by the addition of the following two sentences: "Such an ac-
tion shall be consolidated with a proceeding pursuant to subdivision
(b) of Section 7017 if a proceeding has been filed under Section 7017.
The parental rights of the alleged natural father shall be determined
as set forth in subdivision (d) of Section 7017."253 The last sentence
of this addition limits the rights of the nonpresumed father, thus ad-
ding a feature which is not present in the UPA.25
The third and final major modification involves California's section
7017(d).255 This subsection, which was adopted from sections 24 and
25 of the UPA,256 provides in (d)(2) that the claim of a nonpresumed
father is to be evaluated on the basis of the best interest of the child,
and that "Section 4600 does not apply to this proceeding." 5 7 As has
been demonstrated, it is this provision which has proven to be the
source of confusion in the California courts.2 8 Significantly, the
UPA includes no such provision, but rather states simply that "If the
natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural fa-
ther, claims custodial rights, the court shall proceed to determine
custodial rights." 259 No standard is provided by which the natural fa-
ther's custody claim is to be evaluated, nor is it provided that a differ-
ent standard is to be used when the custody claim is made by a
presumed father.260 Furthermore, the comment to this section
makes clear the intent to distinguish fathers on the basis of the inter-
est which they have shown in the child, not on their presumed or
nonpresumed status.261
An action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship with
respect to a child who has no presumed father under Section 4 may be
brought by the child, the mother or personal representative of the child, the
[appropriate state agency], the personal representative or a parent of the
mother if the mother has died, a man alleged or alleging himself to be the fa-
ther, or the personal representative or a parent of the alleged father if the al-
leged father has died or is a minor.
Id.
253. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006(c) (West Supp. 1990).
254. W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 308, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865
(1979).
255. See supra note 129 for the text of this provision.
256. Unif. Parentage Act §§ 24 and 25 provide the guidelines for the identification
and notification of the unwed father when the mother chooses to relinquish the child
for adoption. California combined parts of these two sections to create CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 7017.
257. See supra note 129 for the text of this provision.
258. See supra notes 128-200 and accompanying text.
259. Unif. Parentage Act § 25(c), 9B U.L.A. 287, 339 (1987).
260. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
261. The comment to Unif. Parentage Act § 25 provides in part:
Subsections (b) through (e) provide a procedure by which the court may as-
certain the identity of the father and permit speedy termination of his poten-
tial rights if he shows no interest in the child. If, on the other hand, the
natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural father claims
1004
[Vol. 17: 969, 1990] The Unwed Father's Custody CMaim
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Despite these differences, it is clear that both the UPA as origi-
nally drafted and as modified by California share a common goal: to
protect the welfare of the nonmarital child. The original UPA, how-
ever, makes it clear that it attempts to meet this goal by "provid[ing]
an efficient procedure by which the rights of the disinterested un-
married father may be terminated."262 The California statutes, how-
ever, provide for termination of the father's rights based on the
desire of the mother rather than the interest which the father has
exhibited in his child. Whether such a result was intended by the
Legislature or merely the unintended effect of the Legislature's at-
tempt to fit the UPA into the scheme which was already intact 263 is
unclear. The result, however, is quite clear: In its attempt to meet
its compelling interest in protecting the welfare of its nonmarital
children, California has failed to narrowly tailor its laws, and as a re-
sult, has infringed on the fundamental rights of the unwed father.
The original UPA reveals the fact that this interest can be met with-
out such an infringement.
C. A Model Approach: The Uniform Putative and Unknown
Father's Act
In 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Putative and Unknown Father's
Act.26 4 The Act, which has been approved by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association, 265 addresses the very issue of this
article and attempts to "clarify the rights of putative and unknown
custodial rights, the court is given authority to determine custodial rights. It
is contemplated that there may be cases in which the man alleging himself to
be the father is so clearly unfit to take custody of the child that the court
would proceed to terminate his potential parental rights without deciding
whether the man actually is the father of the child. If, on the other hand, the
man alleging himself to be the father and claiming custody is prima facie fit
to have custody of the child, an action to ascertain paternity is indicated, un-
less a voluntary acknowledgment can be obtained in accordance with Section
4(a)(5) of this Act.
Unif. Parentage Act § 25, 9B U.L.A. 287, 340-41 (1987) (emphasis in original).
262. Unif. Parentage Act, Prefatory Note, 9B. U.L.A. at 289 (emphasis added).
263. It is significant that the drafters of the UPA recognized the probability of diffi-
culties arising out of an attempt to adopt only parts or modifications of the Act. For
this reason, they warned: "A review of the Act will indicate that it is one interlocking
and interdependent piece of legislation that does not lend itself to being enacted in
part." Unif. Parentage Act, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287, 289 (1987).
264. Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act 9B U.L.A. at 16 (Master ed.
Supp. 1989).
265. See ABA Adopts Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act, 8 A.B.A. Juv. &
CHILD WELFARE L. REP. 31 (April 1989).
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fathers in legal proceedings involving custody, visitation, and adop-
tion of their children."266
Section 5 of the Act, which addresses the court's determination of
the father's parental rights, provides a list of fourteen factors that
the court should consider when "determining whether to protect or
terminate the parental rights of a putative father."267 The court is to
apply these factors in order to determine, under section 6, "(i)
whether a familial bond between the father and the child has been
established; or (ii) whether the failure to establish a familial bond is
justified, and the father has the desire and potential to establish the
bond."268
Most importantly, section 6 continues by directing:
If either clause (i) or (ii) is determined affirmatively, the court may terminate
the parental rights of the father... only if failure to do so wouldbe detrimen-
tal to the child. If neither (i) or (ii) is determined affirmatively, the court
may terminate the parental rights of the father if doing so will be in the best
interests of the child.2 6 9
Thus, the UPUFA specifically provides that when the court deter-
mines that the failure of the father to establish a relationship with
his child is justified, and he stands ready to do so at this time, he
266. 1&
267. UPUFA § 5. The factors listed are:
(1) the age of the child;
(2) the nature and quality of any relationship between the man and the
child;
(3) the reasons for any lack of a relationship between the man and the child;
(4) whether a parent and child relationship has been established between
the child and another man;
(5) whether the child has been abused or neglected;
(6) whether the man has a history of substance abuse or of abuse of the
mother or the child;
(7) any proposed plan for the child;
(8) whether the man seeks custody and is able to provide the child with
emotional or financial support and a home, whether or not he has had
opportunity to establish a parental relationship with the child;
(9) whether the man visits the child, has shown any interest in visitation, or,
desiring visitation, has been effectively denied opportunity to visit the
child;
(10) whether the man is providing financial support for the child according to
his means;
(11) whether the man provided emotional or financial support for the mother
during her prenatal, natal, and postnatal care period;
(12) the circumstances of the child's conception, including whether the child
was conceived as a result of forcible rape or incest;
(13) whether the man has formally or informally acknowledged or declared
his possible paternity of the child; and
(14) other factors the court considers relevant to the standards stated in Sec-
tion 6.
268. UPUFA § 6(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the UPUFA supports the opinion of
the Jermstad court, see supra note 150, that the court should consider the attempts
made by the father who was prohibited by the mother from developing the necessary
parent-child relationship.
269. UPUFA § 6(b) (emphasis added).
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must be afforded a parental preference in the form of the detriment
test.
As proposals for legislative change are presented in the following
section of this article, the UPUFA should serve to show the desirabil-
ity and feasibility of a statutory scheme which protects the rights of
the interested nonpresumed father in California.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
The law in California which addresses the issues involved in the
adoption of a newborn child consists of a complicated intertwining of
several statutes which were enacted many years apart.270 There is no
doubt that the Legislature, each time it has made additions to this
body of law, has carefully attempted to orchestrate an effective and
workable interrelationship between the old and new laws. The same
degree of care and precision will be required in order to amend the
law to recognize the constitutional rights of the unwed father who
has promptly acknowledged paternity and sought custody of his
child. Because of this, the following proposals are not intended to
provide a complete blueprint for the alterations to be made, but
rather are intended to set forth an approach or a stepping-stone from
which to begin.
The first proposal is that section 7017 should be amended so that it
no longer provides for the claims of presumed and nonpresumed fa-
thers to be evaluated by different standards, and thus becomes more
like the original UPA.271 As a result, the law would distinguish be-
tween unwed fathers on the basis of the interest which they have ex-
hibited in their children and would focus on the appropriateness of
270. California first enacted Civil Code section 224 in 1872, and by doing so refused
to recognize the interests of the unwed father. See supra notes 61-63 and accompany-
ing text. Section 224 was amended several times as a result of the subsequent enact-
ment of both the Family Law Act, which includes section 4600, and the UPA, which
includes sections 7004 and 7017. The 1975 amendment to the California Civil Code,
made in conjunction with the adoption of the UPA, resulted in the removal of the dis-
tinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, so that section 224 now provides
that "[a] child having a presumed father under subdivision (a) of Section 7004 cannot
be adopted without the consent of its parents if living... nor a child with no presumed
father under subdivision (a) of Section 7004 without the consent of its mother if living
.... CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1982).
271. In effect, such an amendment would result in an affirmation of the California
Supreme Court's ruling in In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (1984), that the parental preference of Section 4600 would apply to all unwed
fathers, both presumed and nonpresumed. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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terminating parental rights, rather than evaluating of the competing
custody claims of the father and prospective adoptive parents.
The disadvantage of such an approach would be its result of grant-
ing a parental preference to every nonmarital father who is identi-
fied, so that the adoptive parents would bear the burden of showing
detriment in every case. In effect, this would negate the purpose for
the presumed-nonpresumed classification altogether, since the con-
sent of all unwed fathers who are identified would be required for
the adoption to take place. While such a result might be desired by
some, it is not a result that seems to be mandated by the
Constitution.27 2
A second proposal that has been suggested is that the court in a
section 7017 hearing should grant custody to the nonpresumed yet in-
terested father, so that he may become presumed under the law.2 73
It is clear that section 7017, in its current form, allows this to occur,
but the standard by which custody is granted is the best interests
test,274 and thus the claim of the nonpresumed but interested father
does not receive protection under the parental preference doctrine.
Therefore, this proposal would require section 7017 to be amended to
provide that the father who is not presumed, but is adequately inter-
ested, should receive the parental preference of section 4600, while
the uninterested father would not.275 Such an amendment would
272. In Lehr, the Court held that "the mere existence of a biological link," while
granting the father an opportunity which no one else possesses, is not enough to create
a constitutionally protected parental right. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1984).
See supra note 53.
273. For a discussion of the background to this suggestion, see supra notes 92-94
and accompanying text. This proposal was expressly made in Judge Bernard Jeffer-
son's dissenting opinion in W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 862 (1979), in which he explained that:
[Sections 7017 and 224] must be interpreted to permit an unmarried father to
have an opportunity to gain the status of a "presumed natural father" by se-
curing custody of his child. If the first opportunity for him to gain such cus-
tody comes as part of an adoption proceeding, filed within a few days after the
birth of his child, that opportunity cannot be precluded by a trial court's de-
termination that the best interests of the child require that he be excluded
from acquiring such an opportunity, even though such a determination may be
predicated in part on the fact that it is the mother's desire that neither she
nor the father have any right to custody.
Md. at 331, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
274. In Jermnstad, for instance, the trial court granted custody to the father appar-
ently based on a determination that such an outcome was in the child's best interests.
Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 537, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (1989). In her
brief submitted to the appellate court, Jermstad's counsel argued that the appeal had
been rendered moot by the fact that Jermstad "became a presumed father, and re-
mains one, upon compliance with the trial court's order awarding him physical custody
of the child." Brief for Respondent at 16.
275. Such an amendment would implement the ruling in Jermstad by providing
two methods by which an unwed father may receive a parental preference: 1) by be-
coming presumed under section 7004(a); and 2) by promptly acknowledging paternity
and seeking custody of the child. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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provide protection for the interested father, but would do so, it
seems, in a rather roundabout way.
A more direct method of accomplishing this is presented by this
third proposal: The amendment of section 7004(a) to allow a father
to become presumed by promptly coming forward to acknowledge pa-
ternity and seek custody of his child.276 Once it is determined that
he is indeed the father of the child, his prompt assertion of an inter-
est in custody would thus demand that he receive the parental pref-
erence of section 4600. The benefit of such an approach is that the
expanded application of the preference would encompass only the
claims of the interested father, so that the claims of those who have
not exhibited a sufficient interest in a timely manner would still be
evaluated only by the best interests test. Thus, the problems of the
first proposals could be avoided.
Of course, the adoption of such an approach would require the cre-
ation of specific methods through which the father would be able to
exhibit the required interest in his child. Such methods could in-
clude a putative fathers registry, as was available to Lehr in New
York.277 Alternatively, or in addition to a registry, a method could be
provided by which the father's interest could be expressed though an
action to establish paternity and seek custody, brought within specific
time constraints. 278
These three proposals, as introduced above, are not presented as
ideal solutions, for each one may be insufficient in various respects.
The important thing is that they represent starting points from
which the Legislature may begin to develop a means of protecting
the interests of the unwed father whose paternal relationship de-
mands constitutional protection.
276. This suggestion was presented in Judge Jefferson's dissent in WE.J., when he
stated:
I would therefore interpret Civil Code section 7004, subdivision (a)(4), as if it
read expressly: "He receives the child into his home and openly holds the
child out as his natural child or seeks to do so and is prevented from doing so
by the acts of the mother of said child."
W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 332, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 880 (1979).
277. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. This suggestion was made previ-
ously in Bodenheimer, supra note 31 at 56-57.
278. It should be noted that Section 7006(c) already provides that an alleged natural
father may bring such an action. As a result of an amendment in 1986, however, this
section now expressly limits the nonpresumed father's rights by providing that these
rights "shall be determined as set forth in subdivision (d) of Section 7017." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7006(c) (West Supp. 1990).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It has been observed that "'to an illegitimate child, the father is
never putative.' Likewise, to an interested father, the child is never
illegitimate."279 Recognizing the principle behind this observation,
American law has moved far from its original stance of limiting and
denying the rights of parents and children on the basis of marital sta-
tus. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this area,
as well as the development of statutory schemes such as the UPA,
have been instrumental in this legal movement.
In California, however, the movement must continue, for the un-
wed father remains in a position in which his opportunity and right
to raise and care for his child may be terminated by the mere show-
ing that placing the child with a married couple would be "best."
Although such a result may be desired when the father has failed to
exhibit an interest in and concern for the child's welfare, the situa-
tion is different when the father has promptly acknowledged his pa-
ternity and has sought the opportunity to care for his child. In such a
case, when there is no showing that custody with the father would be
detrimental to the child, the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution demand that the father be given this opportunity.
JEFFREY S. BOYD
279. Note, supra note 10 at 1083.
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